29 July 2021
Iraq
A plague on both your houses.
By Neil Tidmarsh
First Afghanistan, and now Iraq. This week, President Biden declared an end to US combat operations in Iraq and announced the imminent withdrawal of US troops from the country.
US forces have been present in Iraq since the invasion of 2003. They fought against Saddam Hussein, and then against al Qaeda, and then against Isis, and were harassed all the time by the irregular Shia militias backed by neighbouring Iran, the USA’s rival for power and influence in the country. More than 4,500 US troops have been killed over those 18 years. There are 2500 US troops currently in Iraq. Not all will be withdrawn – some will remain to continue training and advising Iraq’s forces.
There are a number of reasons behind the decision to withdraw: Isis has been defeated on the battlefield; a vote passed in the Iraq parliament last year demanded an end to the US presence; elections are due in October and the chances of prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi – sympathetic to the USA and the West – will be improved by the withdrawal.
Many commentators believe that an absent US will inevitably lead to Iran completing its dominance of the country. For almost twenty years, the USA and Iran have been competing in a tug-of-war for the control of Iraq, and it’s widely predicted that a US withdrawal will gift the country to Tehran’s theocracy and its terrorist-sponsoring pariah state. “If the US vacates Iraq, Iran will be handed its biggest prize” announced the leader Baghdad Blues in Tuesday’s The Times. “It tilts the balance of advantage in the region towards Tehran.”
There are a number of reasons, however, why this worrying scenario may not materialise. Iran’s influence in Iraq would not inevitably increase following a US withdrawal. Under current conditions, it is in many ways more likely to decrease.
With a traditionally Shia establishment and a majority Shia population, Iraq was naturally vulnerable to the expansionist ambitions of Iran, its powerful Shia neighbour, following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Tehran made the most of this, backing Shia militias against US forces and encouraging the oppression of the country’s Sunni population which led first to a devastating civil war and then to an even more devastating terrorist insurgency, al Qaeda and Isis both riding vengeful tides of Sunni resentment.
But more recently, Iraqi public opinion has been turning against Iran. Tehran’s power and influence is resented by many Iraqis, Sunni and Shia alike. Surprisingly, among working class Shia Iraqis – traditionally Tehran’s most enthusiastic supporters in Iraq – resentment has turned to downright hostility. Iran has simply been too heavy-handed in its exercise of power within Iraq. The massive and widespread anti-government demonstrations of two years ago were protesting against Iran’s influence as much as against government corruption and inefficiency. The reaction of the Iranian-backed security forces only reinforced this image of Tehran as an untrustworthy bully, ruling by corruption and repression at home and exporting corruption and repression abroad; the army, the police, armed militias, masked snipers and other Iranian agents opened fire on the protesters, sending hundreds to the graveyard and thousands to the hospital. Revulsion at this slaughter intensified anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country and led to the resignation of Mr Abdel Abdel-Mahdi, Iraq’s pro-Iran prime minister, and to the installation of a pro-Western prime minister and to the reinstatement of the anti-Iran general whose dismissal sparked the protests in the first place.
It seems that the people of Iraq would like to see the US withdraw from their country, hence that vote in parliament and the continued attacks by militias on US bases – but this does not mean that they would like to see Iran take its place. On the contrary, it seems that they want Iran to withdraw as well; they want all foreign powers to stop interfering in their country. Even those militias which are trying to implement that parliamentary vote by force appear to have ditched their alignment to Iran – they “now claim to promote an Iraqi nationalism independent of both Washington and Tehran” (The Times).
This became particularly evident at the last election, in May 2018: voters had a clear choice between prime minister Haider al-Abadi, backed by the West and supported by the USA, and Hadi al-Ameri, a ex-militia leader, backed by Iran. But neither of them won; a non-aligned, non-sectarian party led by a populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr secured an overwhelming majority of the votes.
Moqtada al-Sadr is a very significant figure. His father, an ayatollah, was killed by Saddam Hussein twenty years ago. Following the chaos and conflicts precipitated by Saddam’s overthrow, Moqtada al-Sadr was considered to be “the gravest threat to western interests in the Middle East” (The Times); he formed and led the Mahdi Army, the force of working-class Shia militants which killed thousands of UK and US soldiers, and which was accused of widespread atrocities against Sunnis in the civil war. He then went into exile in Iran. On his return to Iraq, however, he renounced violence, called for an end to armed conflict, demanded the eviction of foreign armed presences and political interferences (including that of Iran), and proposed a secular and technocratic government. He led an anti-corruption drive, which included attacking MPs in his own party, and put together a pluralistic and diverse group of parties – including communists, liberals and secularists – to fight the election.
His victory surprised everyone, and even though he declined to be prime minister, he remains the most influential political figure in Iraq today. Neither the USA nor Iran seems to know what to make of him. A plague on both your houses, he seems to be saying.
But what chances would this popular and growing Iraqi nationalism, healthily hostile to any foreign interference, have against a ruthless power like Iran, which has shown scant regard for popular opinion in the past and which would have a free hand in Baghdad if the USA abandoned the contest?
Very good chances, it could be argued. Today, Iran is consumed by intractable problems, both at home and abroad (see Iran: Overreach in the Middle East, Shaw Sheet 14 May 2020). Its economy is on its last legs, ruined by corruption, inefficiency, the collapse in the price of oil, US sanctions, the massive and unsustainable cost of military adventurism across the region, and severe droughts and water-shortages. These water-shortages are adding fuel to the widespread and increasingly angry protests against corruption and repression which continue to grow in spite of the violence and brutality of the security services’ reaction. Abroad, Iran is on the back foot across the region. Lebanon, more or less a client state thanks to the power wielded by Tehran’s proxy Hezbollah, has imploded following mass anti-Iran protests. Iran is pulling out of Syria, its forces pounded by Israeli air-strikes and its political influence eclipsed by Moscow. And Iran has been hit badly by Covid-19 – its rates of infection and the death tally are the worst in the Middle East.
Under these circumstances, it’s difficult to imagine Tehran having the power or resources to continue to exert its will over the people of neighbouring Iraq once the USA has withdrawn.
For almost twenty years, the USA has justified its presence in Iraq as a bulwark against Iran; and Iran has justified its presence in Iraq as a bulwark against the USA. Yin and yang. Take one away, and the other one must go too. If the USA goes, Iran will no longer have an excuse to stay. Iraq appears to be ready and eager to stand on its own two feet. Now could in fact be the perfect time for the USA to withdraw.
