15 September 2016
The Syrian Cease-Fire
Third time lucky?
by Neil Tidmarsh
The cease-fire was announced by US secretary of state John Kerry on Friday, and came into force at sunset on Monday. Russia has agreed to persuade Assad to respect the truce and allow humanitarian aid through to besieged rebel areas; it is also hoped that Russia will persuade Assad to lift the siege of rebel-held areas of Aleppo altogether. In return, the USA has agreed to launch joint operations with Russia against the terrorist groups Isis and al-Qaeda if the cease-fire holds for more than seven days; the aim is to take them out of the equation while the other opposition groups and the Assad regime can continue with talks on the road towards a permanent peace.
The first nationwide truce, in February, lasted only a few days before the regime started bombing civilians again. In May, a five-day truce held out in Aleppo, but intense violence soon returned to the city. What are the chances that this latest cease-fire might be more long-lasting?
The amount of time and effort which the USA and Russia have put into negotiating with each other must be cause for optimism; John Kerry and Sergei Lavrov have been talking to each other for the last two months. The more or less universal backing by the other countries involved is another reason for hope: Iran expressed support for the truce and for the pursuit of a political settlement; Turkey is sending an aid convoy of thirty trucks loaded with food, clothing and toys to the suburbs of Aleppo besieged by the regime; and most of the opposition groups have signed up to the cease-fire.
Most, but not all. Drawing a line between terrorist groups and non-terrorist groups is not entirely straightforward. Isis and al-Qaeda are clearly beyond the pale, but groups such as the Nusra Front, traditionally affiliated with al-Qaeda, are more problematic. The Nusra Front recently changed its name to the Fateh al-Sham Front (FSF) to distance itself from al-Qaeda, but neither the USA nor Russia have been convinced that the transformation is any more than skin-deep. They have declared the FSF to be an enemy, a target of the planned joint operations, and have warned the other opposition groups to sever all ties with it. Some opposition groups have objected, even those who have no common ideological or religious cause with the FSF; they say that the FSF is a vital ally in the fight against Assad’s forces – if it is removed, they will be fatally weakened and Assad is unlikely to be able to resist the temptation to exploit that weakness on the battlefield.
The most intractable issue, as always, remains that of Assad and his regime. Announcing the cease-fire last Friday, John Kerry said “The United States is going the extra mile here because we believe Russia and my colleague (Sergei Lavrov) have the capability to press the Assad regime to stop this conflict and make peace.” Whether or not everyone else shares that belief (and apparently many in the Pentagon do not), the statement does seem to suggest that the ball is in Assad’s court; whether the cease-fire holds is up to him more than to any of the other participants.
He has not officially signed up to the cease-fire plan (although Sana, his state’s news agency, reports that he has), and only hours before it was due to start he was vowing in public to take back all of Syria from the opposition. He launched a fresh round of attacks between Friday (when Kerry and Lavrov signed the deal) and Monday (when the cease-fire came into effect); more than 100 people were killed by his planes and artillery; sixty were killed by an airstrike on a marketplace in Idlib alone, and even the headquarters of the White Helmets (the Nobel peace prize nominated civilian search and rescue unit) in Saraqeb came under attack. And even if Russia does persuade him to honour the cease-fire, the question of whether any of the opposition will be prepared to deal with him in the subsequent negotiations is uncertain to say the least; Assad’s future remains potentially the most serious obstacle to any kind of political resolution.
Russia and the USA intend to use the cease-fire to gather intelligence about the disposition of Isis, el-Qaeda and the FSF so that joint operations against them can proceed as soon as (and if) seven days of peace have been achieved. The operations will be run from a ‘joint implementation centre’ in Geneva. But there are also question marks about whether such joint operations between the USA and Russia can ever work. There is deep scepticism in the Pentagon, where few believe that Russia can or indeed wants to bring Assad into line. Moreover, few US military officials are prepared to trust Russia as an ally; many believe that Russia will seize the operations as an opportunity to infiltrate US security and steal military secrets.
At the time of writing – Wednesday evening – the cease-fire has held, with some infringements reported on either side. The people of Syria are enjoying a third day of relative peace. That is something to be grateful for, whatever happens over the next few days, weeks or months. At one point – when that room at the G2 summit was prepared for an announcement which was never made, and John Kerry admitted that the USA and Russia had failed to reach an agreement – it looked as if Syria wasn’t going to get even these three days of peace. And if this cease-fire collapses tomorrow, others must follow. The process must continue, even if the only encouragement available might be Samuel Beckett’s grim advice “Failed? Try again. Fail again. Fail better!”
If you enjoyed this article please share it using the buttons above.
Please click here if you would like a weekly email on publication of the Shaw Sheet
