03 December 2015
CAMERON, EUROPE AND AN UNLIKELY VICTORY
by Tom Dowling
Britain’s relationship with Europe has divided the country for centuries, so it was difficult to see what David Cameron hoped to achieve when in 2013 he announced that the Conservatives would, if successful in the 2015 General Election, hold a referendum on whether the electorate wished to stay in or leave the EU. The question would be put after he had first sought a revised relationship with the EU. Cameron was under no external pressure to hold a referendum at all. Voters were not demanding it, while neither his erstwhile coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, nor Labour were, to put it politely, keen. Europe is the third rail of Tory politics, to be avoided wherever possible, the party’s deep divisions having badly damaged its electoral prospects in the New Labour era. It seemed to many that a panicking Cameron was reacting to an over estimated electoral threat from UKIP.
Whatever his motives, Cameron’s speech, which raised important questions, stood on its own merits. He addressed uncomfortable issues which Europe has sought to, but can no longer, avoid. What is Europe about? How much Europe do we want and on what terms? How can Europe be made fit for purpose? These are concerns shared by other members and events since 2013 have given them added weight. Immigration has become more than just a British fear while those not in the Euro now also share Britain’s concerns about the impact of reactionary decisions made to save it. Britain’s aspirations have remained constant in a changing Europe, an association of independent states sharing a single free market. Not for Britain the ‘ever closer union’ of 1957’s Treaty of Rome. Originally seen as treaty padding, its radical nature became real with the Euro, which changed the Europe that Britain joined and not for the better. The Euro has not worked. Europe is now at a crossroads, its governance a failure. It is unable to revert to the union of old or remain as is but change will be difficult.
Cameron rightly believes that the EU lacks a common identity, view and destiny while its structures are unfit for purpose. For example while the Euro crises have ostensibly been about assymetric responsibility for losses on bad credit decisions jointly made, Helmut Schmidt has said that poor political leadership rather than a flawed single currency or an excess of debt is Europe’s real problem. Europe lacked both the authorative central institutions to impose a solution and a common view of the crises to compensate for its lack of institutions.
Solutions are constrained by differing domestic politics, forcing leaders to bypass voters as urgent demands leave little room for democratic niceties. Europe, Cameron says, is now done to people. What has been done has been poor, leading to a loss of legitimacy and support. This matters to a Britain that views issues practically rather than ideologically and for whom good governance with political accountability is essential if Europe is to work.
Post war European Union was sponsored by America to counter the Soviets, but soon hijacked by France to contain Germany and maintain its global influence. It has been wrongly credited with delivering Europe’s peace and prosperity, leading to hubris, complacency and the vanity of the single currency. It was the Cold War which kept the peace while Europe has not been uniquely prosperous. Accounting for only 7% of global population but 50% of its welfare budget, Europe is living beyond its means and facing challenges in funding its defining social programmes. Brezinski called Europe the world’s most comfortable retirement home. Germany and others know this is unsustainable without a big improvement in Europe’s performance. These are Britain’s natural constituents. With Germany again dominant and France weakened, we may see a changed European dynamic based on a shared free market ideology.
British opposition to Europe ranges from die-hards disliking the principle to natural scepticism. Cameron’s big questions do not resonate with voters who judge Europe in more simplistic terms, nowhere more so than on immigration. Referenda are often reduced to and decided on simplicities. Voters, believing Britain is admitting too many immigrants, disproportionately blame Europe though the immigrants come to Britain from all over the world because it is successful and a good place to live and work. Syrian refugees’ reluctance to stay in Greece or France says much. Britain’s partners have resisted Cameron’s calls for restrictions but their mood may now change in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis and terror attacks. Britain cannot expect to stop internal EU immigration, but can legitimately raise external immigration and internal welfare tourism. The latter is overstated but emotive and can be dealt with. Cameron will not be without support in Europe’s capitals for reasonable demands, credibly put. Many will want Britain to remain in Europe.
Germany will not want to face France and Brussels’ Napoleonic bureaucracy alone. Europe’s northern members, closer to Britain than to the periphery, will want to retain her economic and military capacities. Europe’s members outside the single currency share Britain’s concerns about being dragged in its wake. Immigration, traditionally internal, may produce greater common ground now that all are externally threatened. Then there is Britain’s trump card. Brexit would badly damage Europe’s elites. Europe only ever expands, never contracts. Britain has often been seen as awkward but that bar has been raised by Athens. Europe has gone to extreme lengths to keep a belligerent and dysfunctional Greece in the Euro and the EU. Losing Greece would have been explicable, indeed rational, but losing the UK would cause incalculable damage to the EU’s prestige. Addressing Britain’s concerns carries an ideological rather than economic cost for Europe but its disastrous management of Greece showed that, when its unity was threatened, core principles were inevitably expendable. Do not be surprised by further flexibility. Cameron is, therefore, likely to secure a deal he can recommend to the electorate. It will be a risk but Cameron may be about to make history….
Electorates rarely like referenda which tend to favour the status quo and be influenced by the standing of the governing party. Too often disgruntled electorates simply use them to punish incumbent elites. Proponents of change, facing a high hurdle, need the point to be simple and the question clear cut. Europe is a complex issue. Expect a campaign of fear. If Cameron delivers anything remotely sensible, also expect the electorate to vote to remain in Europe, unless events conspire to radically change the mood in the interim. Fear may then have the opposite effect. If successful, Cameron will have done not only the UK, but also the rest of Europe, a considerable service. Domestically he will have settled the issue for a generation. In European terms, he may force the EU to finally address some pretty fundamental questions it has too long been avoiding. It will be an achievement of the first order. My money is on him pulling him it off.
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