03 December 2015
An Uncertain Endgame
by John Watson
It is right that British politics should be dominated by the question of whether to bomb ISIL in Syria and it is to the credit of Westminster that the division is not down party lines. Clearly the decision bothers MPs and it is good that some of them – most prominently, perhaps, Mr Corbyn – are prepared to risk their political capital by standing out against a course which they believe to be mistaken.
Have a look at the Prime Minister’s “Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee”, in which he sets out the government’s case for extending the bombing to Syria, and you will see why they are worried. The UK’s strategy for Syria has two limbs. One is the defeat of ISIL, so that it ceases to be a threat to us and to its neighbours. The other is the negotiation of a new political settlement in Syria with a view to creating a government which could “credibly represent all the Syrian people”. That is quite an ask because Assad has always been a key ally of Russia while we (and the US and Turkey) view the brutality with which his regime has made war on his own people as a fundamental cause of Syria’s instability. Our plan is to replace him by the moderate opposition – ie opposition who are also opposed to ISIL. Russia’s is to support him and bomb the moderates. It is not quite the same thing!
Actually, November’s meeting of the International Syria Support Group went fairly well. They didn’t get down to specifics, of course, but the members of the Group (which include the UN, the US, the UK, France, Russia and Turkey) made a joint commitment to a political transition in Syria, to work towards a ceasefire and to meet again to review progress. So far so good, but will a viable plan really emerge? The fragile consensus has already been rocked by the shooting down of a Russian plane by the Turkish military. Will it survive that? Yes, probably; but the incident, which took place because the Russians were bombing groups who are ethnically Turkish and opposed to Assad, is certainly a symptom of the tensions which threaten to blow the ISSG apart. Suppose the idea of finding a solution which the US and Russia and their respective allies can agree on is just a pipe dream. What would that mean?
Move on to then to the magic 70,000. These are the moderate Syrian forces who, supported by coalition airstrikes, are to take back and administer ISIL territory. Even if 70,000 would be enough, they are hardly going to be able to concentrate on ISIL if they are at war with Russia and Assad. What if they cannot do the job? Will a reluctant coalition finally put boots on the ground or will ISIL be left in place, strengthened by its apparent invulnerability?
These uncertainties weigh heavily on the nerves of politicians who recall the chaos which followed the removal from power of Saddam Hussein and of Colonel Gaddafi. Could it all go wrong again? Could we get sucked in and end up using ground troops? The answer to both of these questions is “possibly”. The endgame is horribly uncertain, but then isn’t it always? It is fashionable to talk about the need for an “exit strategy” before military action, but in reality it must be rare for such a strategy to survive until it is ready to be used. If peace-time politics are unpredictable, fighting a war is much more so and it is very difficult indeed to guess where things will come out. Perhaps, then, those who call for such a strategy are asking for something which never really exists. In the end you always have to rely on dealing with things as they arise rather than on a grand plan.
To attack ISIL in Syria is to move further down a risky path but, unless ISIL is to be allowed to expand unchallenged, the risks have to be taken by someone. Actually we already take some ourselves. We fly RAF reconnaissance flights over Syria and, of course, we are already bombing in Iraq. The question is then whether we should bear military risk – and also our share of the responsibility if it all goes wrong – to the same extent as our allies France and the US. In the end the burden has to be borne by someone, and if ISIL is a threat to us it is not obvious why we should leave a heavier burden on our allies.
Matthew Parris is right to point out in “The Times” that a desire to join our allies in the fight is central to the Government’s thinking. However, that is not necessarily a bad reason. The point of allies is that you take the weight together and that remains the case where that “weight” includes a daunting mix of risk, uncertainty and responsibility.
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