1 October 2015
Syria: A dilemma for Obama, or for Putin?
by Neil Tidmarsh
This week, President Putin appealed to the United Nations on behalf of President Assad of Syria. How should President Obama and the West respond to that appeal?
Before we consider that question, it’s worth reminding ourselves who is fighting who in Syria. Essentially, the civil war is being fought between President Assad’s government and various Syrian rebel groups. These groups range from ‘moderates’ who are fighting for the kind of democratic and free society envisaged by the Arab Spring, to Islamic militants who are fighting Assad’s Shia regime to establish Syria as a Sunni Islamic state. This domestic struggle is complicated by two international participants: Isis, who are prepared to take on all comers – government and rebels – to incorporate Syria into its Sunni Caliphate; and the Kurds, who are defending their homeland which spans the borders of Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and are fighting for independence.
Assad’s state has shrunk to a core strip in the west, running north and south along the Mediterranean and the border with Lebanon. He would have been defeated some time ago had he not had the military support of his fellow Shias – Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah – and of his ally Russia. The rebels opposing him have the support of the Sunni states: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies. With this support, both sides have proved to be too strong to lose but too weak to win. Hence the protracted but deadly stalemate that has sent so many refugees fleeing the country.
The USA and its Western allies have consistently condemned Assad’s regime but have been reluctant to take an active part in the civil war. Their support of the groups which have been fighting his political tyranny and military barbarity has been largely moral; Obama and his European allies have always insisted that no solution is possible while Assad remains in power, but they haven’t struck against him, in spite of the urgings of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Their military involvement in Syria has been aimed at Isis. This scrupulousness is one of the reasons for the failure of the Pentagon’s hugely expensive campaign to arm and train moderate rebel groups to fight Isis; the priority of almost all rebel groups is to defeat Assad rather than Isis.
Now President Putin is beefing up Russia’s military support of Assad and insisting that Assad’s government and its shrunken state is the only hope for stability in the region and for the defeat of Isis.
The USA and the West now face a dilemma. Putin’s suggestion that Isis will never be defeated in Syria while the country is divided by civil war has a lot of credibility. Given that, and the increasing problem of refugees, it might make sense to grasp whatever chance for peace there is, even if it means negotiating with Assad or at least his government and coming to an agreement with it. Then all sides could turn their undivided attention to Isis, the rebuilding of the country could begin, and the refugee flight would come to a halt. The West’s moral scrupulousness has so far proved pretty ineffective; Putin’s committed and dedicated realpolitic is beginning to look decisive and effective; so it must be very tempting to follow his lead.
But is there really a conflict here between moral scruples and political realities? Scruples might argue against joining with a power which the West has condemned for annexing the Crimea and for supporting separatists in the Ukraine; it might argue against dealing with a dictator who kills innocent civilians by the hundred by dropping barrel bombs on market-places and hospitals: but does political reality really argue in favour of it? If Obama did join negotiations with Syria and agree peace terms with Assad and/or his government, would that really bring peace to the region?
Almost certainly not. A compromise with the Assad government is highly unlikely to ever bring peace, because Obama and the European leaders aren’t the only parties insisting on Assad and his government’s departure before peace can be a possibility. All the rebel groups and their backers insist on it, too. Could Obama and Putin force a peace agreement on them? Unlikely. Even if they could and did, conflict would continue. The civil war wouldn’t end, and it might even mutate into unforeseen new configurations which would further destabilise the region and escalate the fighting. Those fighting Assad, even the moderates, would never forgive anyone who compromised with Assad. It would be seen as a betrayal, and it would drive them to extremes, even into the arms of Isis.
The Russians have two aims in Syria: bolstering the regime of their ally, Assad; and retaining and enlarging their influence in the region. Neither of those aims is likely to contribute towards peace and stability in the region. If they do, then so much the better, and full credit to Putin. But in the meantime, both moral considerations and political realities suggest that it would be best to stand aside. Nevertheless, Obama and Putin must continue to communicate about Syria; Putin knows that his client is on the life-support machine and the cost of keeping him breathing is likely to be very high – sooner or later he will decide that it is too high, and then he will have interesting proposals to put to Obama. But in the meantime there is no reason why the USA and Europe should join Russia in what may well prove to be a very uncomfortable bed of the Kremlin’s making. The dilemma about what to do with Assad remains Putin’s.
The struggle against Isis can continue separately, and if Russia has a contribution to offer then they are free and welcome to make it.
