6 August 2015
Cooped up in Calais
By John Watson
The attempts by migrants to force the passage of the channel at Calais is just one aspect of a huge international problem. From a British perspective, Calais is the frontier but for the signatories to the Schengen agreement and especially the countries of southern Europe the true frontier is the Mediterranean. How those who arrive in Europe are split between the member states of the EU is a secondary concern.
It is easy enough to find people to blame. One might start with the Western powers that upset the balance in the Middle East without a plan for dealing with the consequences. One might blame Isis for displacing those communities that do not share its beliefs. Then there are the Turks whose attacks on the Kurds prevent a better buffer being formed. Or there are the Americans and the British who left Iraq and Afghanistan too early. The list goes on and on and in the end it doesn’t really matter. The question is, what we all going to do now?
It is possible to approach this in a number of ways and each of these imposes is own red lines. To the British public, the main concern is not to overcrowd our island further and particularly not to do so by adding to immigrant communities which we have not been wholly successful in absorbing. Any politician who suggested letting in the migrants on more than a very limited basis would be wasting both his breath and his career. The limits to politically acceptable absorption are likely to stay low both here and elsewhere in Europe so we have to look elsewhere for a real solution.
At one end of the spectrum there are those who think that the matter is simply one of using the army and building walls. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such measures. After all, once it has been decided to limit immigration that decision needs to be implemented. There are however two difficulties. One is that some of the more desperate migrants will get through and the building of walls to keep migrants out does nothing to relieve their desperation. The other is that a purely defensive approach crosses a moral red line and leaves people feeling, rightly, uncomfortable.
Perhaps then we should look at the problem in a different way. Whatever measures may be taken for the short term, the real challenge is how to reduce the pressure from individuals who, faced with no future at home, are prepared to risk their lives to restart in the UK or elsewhere in Europe.
One of the oddities about debates on migration is the distinction drawn between the economic and the political refugee. If you are pursued by oppressors you have a right to asylum. If, however, you are simply moving because everyone in your country is poor, then the UK at least will not let you in. This division probably made sense when poverty levels were stable and economic migrants were lifting themselves out of a viable community in search of easier living. Global warming, however, shifts the goalpost because, as the world heats up, ways of life which were formerly viable will cease to be so. It follows that in the future there will be less distinction between political and economic refugees and that can only increase the numbers of the desperate.
If public opinion will not let the government share our land with refugees, what is there that we can share instead which will ease their plight? There are three answers to this: wealth, expertise and political stability. If we could give the developing world access to these commensurate with the access which we enjoy ourselves, a much better future could be provided. The difficult question is, of course, how to do it.
When natural disasters occur they are normally followed by a period of blame. Perhaps more precautions should be taken. Perhaps the world was too slow in coming to the rescue. One item normally on the list, however, is a failure by the authorities locally to get to the aid to the right place. Where the disaster is in a war zone or is the result of ethnic cleansing it is much worse. Then, there is almost no chance of aid getting through in meaningful quantities.
Nowadays there is a reluctance to put boots on the ground of other people’s countries. That is partly because of a respect for national sovereignty, partly because of political balances which might be upset but very largely because interventions in places like Afghanistan and Iraq have come at great cost and often achieved very little. It is thought wiser now to write a cheque for some aid and let the locals get on with it. At least that keeps us free of the “neo-imperialist” label.
The trouble is that unless we are prepared to assert ourselves fairly ruthlessly we cannot get wealth, technology and stability through often corrupt local administrations to those who need it. “They are elected to government” we say “we have done our best”.
There is a clear choice here. Either we can respect local political structures and accept that there is little we can do to relieve the suffering which drives out local communities. In that case we will always need high walls and will have to get used to the sight of the desperate and the starving. Still it will have a good side. We will have to make few sacrifices and can reflect smugly on how far the world has moved on from European colonialism.
The alternative is to take a more interventionist approach, to put troops on the ground to protect communities, to sidestep or remove corrupt regimes which would siphon off the aid and technology we provide. It would not be at all easy. Boots on the ground mean losses and UN power broking would make it difficult to bring the actions required within international law. Some of it would go wrong too, so an interventionist Europe would have to be tough enough to shoulder blame and carry on.
Perhaps, then, it isn’t worth doing after all. I suppose that depends on how strongly you feel about the plight of those on their way from Calais or getting into boats on the southern Mediterranean shore.
